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The arguments advanced by Bearden in support of the jury's verdict are 
unpersuasive. First, Wardley has satisfied its burden of marshaling the evidence. That 
evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that Wardley breached its fiduciary 
duty. Second, despite the fact that Wardley's argument on this point was not raised 
below, important countervailing principles demand that this Court address the validity of 
the statement in both Phillips v. JCM Development Co., 666 P.2d 876, 881(Utah 1983), 
and Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, f 25, 458 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 15, that real estate agents are automatically employees of their broker. Third, 
Wardley's motions for summary judgment and for a directed verdict on the issue of 
vicarious liability should have been granted by the trial court. Finally, even if summary 
judgment or a directed verdict was improper, the jury's verdict cannot stand where 
(1) there is no reasonable basis for the jury's award of damages; and (2) there was no 
basis for the award of punitive damages against Wardley. For all of these reasons, the 




I. WARDLEY HAS SATISFIED ITS OBLIGATION OF MARSHALING THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Before turning to the substantive arguments, it is necessary to briefly address 
Bearden's contention that in its 69 paragraphs of marshaled facts, Wardley has failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's finding that Wardley breached its fiduciary 
duty and therefore, the court need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the 
findings. 
A. Bearden Has Misinterpreted the Marshaling Requirement. 
Primarily, Bearden contends that Wardley has not marshaled all the evidence 
supporting the jury's finding that Wardley breached its fiduciary duty to Bearden because 
"the presentation of supporting evidence must also be found in the argument portion of 
the brief and the appellant must demonstrate why such evidence is insufficient." Brief of 
Appellees at 14. This is misreading of Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). There, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the appellant had not satisfied 
the marshaling requirement where the "Facts" section of the brief inadequately set forth 
both parties' 'Versions" of the facts and where the "[t]he requisite presentation of 
supporting evidence is also not found in the argument portion of appellant's brief." Id. at 
304. Most recently, in Roderick v. Ricks, 2002 UT 84, 54 P.3d 1119, the Utah Supreme 
1
 Wardley's failure to address any of the arguments made in Brief of Appellees 
should not be treated as a concession as to those arguments but, rather, as an indication 
that Wardley has nothing new to add beyond what was presented in its opening brief. See 
Utah R. App. P. 24(c). 
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Court stated: 'Though Castleton did mention some evidence favorable to the court's 
finding, he generally dispersed this evidence throughout his appellate brief. To comply 
with the marshaling requirement, appellants must marshal all the favorable evidence at 
the point at which they challenge the factual finding." Id. at f 47, n. 11. Similarly in 
Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, 20 P.3d 332, appellants were criticized for presented only 
selected facts in a scatter-shot, incoherent, and poorly organized manner. Id. at ffl 17-19. 
These cases suggest that the evidence supporting the factual findings should be 
marshaled in a separate section of the brief, not dispersed throughout the argument 
portion of the brief as argued by Bearden. Rather, the argument section should be used to 
demonstrate why the previously marshaled evidence remains insufficient to support the 
factual findings. Wardley has satisfied this requirement. 
B. The Evidence Marshaled by Bearden Merely Restates Evidence 
Previously Marshaled by Wardley in Its Initial Brief. 
An examination of the evidence cited by Bearden at pages 14-15 of her brief 
reveals that little of substance is added to the evidence previously marshaled by Wardley. 
The best examples of this are Bearden's paragraphs 6-8 which expressly cite Wardley's 
factual presentation. In an attempt to bolster her own legal contentions, in the other 
paragraphs, Bearden merely restates, in an argumentative tone, facts marshaled by 
Wardley: 
• Compare Bearden's paragraphs 1-2 with Wardley's paragraph 7; 
• Compare Bearden's paragraphs 3-4 with Wardley's paragraphs 23 and 
33-35; 
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• Compare Bearden's paragraph 5 with Wardley's paragraphs 18-19, 22 and 
24;and 
• Compare Bearden's paragraph 9 with Wardley's paragraphs 7, 27-28 and 
31-32. 
See generally Brief of Appellants at 20-23. Thus, it appears, based on the lack of new 
evidence introduced by Bearden that Wardley has actually done a comprehensive 
marshaling of the facts. Certainly, there is no reason for this Court to dismiss Wardley's 
arguments on the basis of a failure to marshal. The evidence cited by Wardley in support 
of the jury's verdict provides the court with the cogent facts and background necessary to 
accurately decide whether the evidence is sufficient to uphold the jury's verdict. 
II. THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S 
FINDING THAT WARDLEY BREACHED ITS FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
BEARDEN. 
In making her primary argument concerning Wardley's direct liable for breach of 
its fiduciary duty, Bearden ignores the fact that Wardley sought a directed verdict on this 
point, arguing that Bearden had not, in its case in chief, produced any evidence regarding 
the standard of care governing real estate professionals. (R., 708 at 172.) That Bearden 
failed to produce any evidence of what Wardley's fiduciary duties were is best evidenced 
by the fact that the only testimony to which she refers in her brief is that of Jeff Sommers, 
who was examined after the erroneous denial of Wardley's motion. (R. 708 at 180-227.) 
At the time the motion for directed verdict was made, there was no evidence of 
Wardley's duty. Without any evidence of duty, there can be no determination of a 
breach. Therefore, Bearden's breach of fiduciary duty claim against Wardley should not 
have gone to the jury. 
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Bearden's argument also ignores Wardley's contention that the confusion created 
by the jury instructions makes it impossible to determine whether the jury held Wardley 
responsible for its own breach - as Bearden contends; or whether they confused Gritton's 
conduct as binding Wardley because the trial court told the jury that Wardley, as a 
corporation, "can act only through its officers and employees, and others designated by 
it as its agents." Instruction No. 23, Corporation Acts Through Its Agents (R. 446) 
(emphasis added). The trial court failed to tell the jury that "agent" meant something 
different in the context of this instruction, or that Gritton was not an "agent" for purposes 
of acting on behalf of the corporate entity. Presuming that the jury followed the court's 
instructions (Brief of Appellees at 16), does not answer Wardley's argument; it makes it. 
III. PHILLIPS IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. 
Wardley stands by the contention advanced in its opening brief that Phillips v. 
JCM Development Co., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983), is no longer good law. In light of this 
reality, the trial court committed clear error in not conducting an independent analysis of 
whether Gritton was an employee of Wardley in deciding whether to grant Wardley's 
motion for summary judgment. 
A. The Supreme Court's Statement in Cannon II that Real Estate Agents 
are Employees Did Not Analyze the Revised Statutory Scheme and Is 
Not Binding in this Case. 
Bearden has responded to Wardley's contention by arguing that the Utah Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Wardley v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, ("Cannon IF) reaffirmed the 
validity of Phillips' holding that a real estate agent is an employee of the broker. Even a 
cursory examination reveals that Cannon His neither persuasive nor dispositive. 
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Nowhere in the Cannon II opinion are the revisions to the statutory scheme mentioned, 
and they certainly were not analyzed. There is no indication in the opinion (or the record 
of that case ) that the statutory changes were even brought to the Utah Supreme Court's 
attention. 
Whether the current real estate statutes alter the conclusion that a real estate agent 
is always to be deemed an employee of his broker has never been addressed at the 
appellate level. This Court should not ignore relevant statutory changes on the basis of 
the Supreme Court's cursory assertion in Cannon II, made without any analysis of the 
issue and where the court did not consider the arguments advanced in this case, before 
2
 This statement can be substantiated by a review of the pleadings and briefs filed in 
that case before the Supreme Court's opinion was rendered. See Wardley Better Homes 
and Gardens v. Cannon, No. 20010245 (Utah Sup. Ct.); Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens v. Cannon, No. 20000128-CA (Utah Ct. App.); Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens v. Cannon, No. 940907000CN (Third Jud. Dist. Ct., Salt Lake County, Utah). 
After the opinion was handed down, the undersigned counsel for Wardley attempted to 
bring the issue to the court's attention by way of a Petition for Rehearing. Petition for 
Rehearing, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, No. 20010245 (Utah Sup. Ct. 
filed Nov. 8, 2002). A copy of the Petition is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." That 
Petition was denied without any stated reason or rationale. Order, Wardley Better Homes 
and Gardens v. Cannon, No. 20010245 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 11, 2002). A copy of 
the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
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this Court. At the very least, this Court should acknowledge the revisions and its ultimate 
decision should analyze their effect with a depth of analysis the issue deserves. 
Upon conducting such an analysis, this Court will undoubtedly conclude that 
Phillips is no longer good law, that whether an employee-employer relationship exists 
should be determined by reference to the test set forth in section 220 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency, which is the test that has been applied by both this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court in most other cases where the nature of such a relationship is at 
issue. See e.g., Glover ex rel Dyson v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385-86 
(Utah 1996); Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1996). Pursuant to that 
established precedent, whether an employer-employee relationship exists depends on 
whether the alleged employer has a right to control the employee. Several facts are 
helpful in determining whether that right to control exists, such a the covenants or 
agreements that exist concerning the right of direction and control over the employee; the 
right to hire and fire; the method of payment (i.e., wages versus payment for a completed 
job or project); and the furnishing of equipment. See id. If that test is applied to this 
The record in Cannon II also reflects that the Utah Association of Realtors® 
sought to submit an amicus curiae brief asserting, on behalf of its 8,900 licensed real 
estate professional members, that the Supreme Court's incorrect statement of the current 
state of the law would fundamentally change the current practices and relationships of 
real estate brokers and agents in Utah. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Leave to File a Brief as Amicus Curiae, Wardley Better Homes 
and Gardens v. Cannon, No. 20010245 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 8, 2002). A copy of the 
Utah Association of Realtors'® Memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit "C." Counsel 
for Cannon objected to this motion as being untimely. Objection to Motion for Leave to 
File Brief of Amicus Curiae (filed November 14, 2002). A copy of the Objection is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "D." The court denied the motion, again without any stated 
reason or rationale. Order. A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "E." 
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case, Gritton was clearly an independent contractor and not an employee of Wardley. See 
Tr. Ex. 7; R. 707 at 155-57; R. 708 at 181-82; Brief of Appellants at 17, f 1. Thus, the 
doctrine of respondeat superior does not provide a basis for holding Wardley vicariously 
liable for Gritton's conduct. 
B. This Court Can Properly Consider the Revisions to the Statutory 
Scheme For the First Time on Appeal, 
Bearden's argument that Wardley failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal 
ignores the exceptions to the rule. In Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline 
Construction, 154 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
"Ordinarily, arguments, positions, and issues may not be raised for the first time on 
appeal. That doctrine is not, however, applied in a vacuum. Where some countervailing 
principle is to be served, the doctrine must occasionally yield." Id. at 676. In Cox Rock 
Products, as in this case, the countervailing principle was the correct interpretation of a 
Utah statute. The Cox court stated: "While parties are ordinarily bound the by logical 
results of their pleadings and trial positions, such devices cannot be used to enlarge the 
scope of legislation beyond that determined by the Legislature." ld\ see also Mel Trimble 
Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(recognizing exception to general rule "when to do otherwise would permit deviation 
from a legislative scheme"); Kaiserman Assocs. v. Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 
(Utah 1998) (addressing an issue sua sponte because: "In our view, an overlooked or 
abandoned argument should not compel an erroneous result. We should not be forced to 
ignore the law just because the parties have not raised or pursued obvious arguments."). 
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Here, important countervailing principles apply. See n. 2, supra. This Court 
should consider Wardley's argument regardless of the manner in which it was raised 
below.4 Already, the law has not been well served by the Utah Supreme Court's 
inattentive citation of Phillips, without any analysis of the issue. The correct 
interpretation of a legislative scheme is the perfect example of an important 
countervailing principle that mandates application of the exception to the rule that issues 
should not be raised for the first time on appeal - especially where the legislative action 
was an obvious response to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Phillips. Significantly, 
Bearden does not examine the case law, examine either the old or new statutes, or offer 
any explanation as to why the underlying reasoning in the Phillips decision continues to 
be sound. 
IV- THE JURY'S FINDING OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Apparently recognizing the weakness of her vicarious liability argument, Bearden 
devotes the majority of her brief to arguing that Wardley breached its fiduciary duty. 
When she finally turns to the issue of vicarious liability she devotes the majority of her 
effort to arguing that the outcome of this appeal is governed by the Utah Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Cannon II. Even ignoring the problems with the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Cannon II, as illustrated in Wardley's Petition for Rehearing in that case, see 
Former counsel for Wardley raised the independent contractor argument in support 
of Wardley's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 240), and unsuccessfully sought a jury 
instruction on the issue. (Compare R. 411, 412, with R. 423-70.) 
269262.1 9 
Exhibit "A," Cannon II does not address the issues under consideration here. Bearden's 
other bases for imposing vicarious liability also faiL 
A. Cannon II Does Not Address the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Cannon II: "Whether a principal is 
vicariously liable for an agent's acts and whether a principal is imputed with his agent's 
knowledge are separate legal questions." 2002 UT 99, f 19 (citation omitted). In fact, 
the court of appeals was criticized for ignoring this distinction. Id. 
More significant in the context of this case, the issue of imputation begs the 
primary question presented by this appeal - what is the scope of Gritton's authority under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Wardley may only be subject to liability for 
Gritton's tortious acts which are done within the course and scope of Gritton's 
employment, applying the three-part test set forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 
P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). As argued in detail in Wardley's opening brief, Bearden failed to 
satisfy both the first and third Birkner criteria: Gritton's conduct was not within the 
general kind he was employed to perform; and Gritton was not acting, even in part, for 
Wardley's benefit. See Brief of Appellants at 30-40. 
In Cannon II, the Supreme Court repeatedly made it clear that "[a] principal is 
imputed with '[a]n agent's knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her 
authority '" 2002 UT 99, f 16 (quoting Maoris v. Sculpted Software, Inc., 2001 UT 
43, f 21, 24 P.3d 984). Later in the opinion, the Court noted: 
Under principles of vicarious liability, a principal is held 
responsible for the tortious acts of an agent acting within the 
scope of the agent's authority. [Citations omitted.] Under 
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principles of imputation, a principal is held responsible for his 
own act, which is deemed to have been committed with the 
knowledge his agent had at the time of the principal's act, 
assuming the agent obtained such knowledge while acting 
within the scope of his authority. 
2002 UT 99, f 19 (citations omitted). The same requirement was noted with respect to 
the Supreme Court's imputing the knowledge as an agent of the corporate entity. Id. 
123. 
Cannon II is not the least bit relevant to the determination of whether Gritton's 
conduct was of the general type he was employed to perform. The facts at issue there are 
completely distinguishable. Cannon II involved the actions of an agent in obtaining a 
listing agreement. Id. f 27 (the agent's conduct clearly was of the 'general kind' that he 
was employed to perform because real estate agents routinely procure listing agreements 
in the process of selling real estate." (Citation omitted.)). 
In the instant case, however, the fraud involved not a listing agreement, but a 
fraudulently obtained warranty deed. Ordinarily real estate agents have nothing to do 
with the actual preparation of the warranty deeds and there is no evidence in the record to 
indicate this was a routine or general practice. (R. 707 at 162; R. 708 at 196.) Thus, 
Cannon II is not persuasive in this case. 
Therefore, either the motion for summary judgment or the motion for directed 
verdict should have been granted. 
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B. Subagency Does Not Provide a Basis for Liability Because Gritton's 
Conduct Was Outside the Scope of His Agency, 
In order for Wardley to be liable on the subagency theory it was necessary for 
Gritton to be acting within the scope of his agency when he defrauded Bearden. 
However, just as Gritton's conduct was outside the scope of his employment, it was also 
outside the scope of his agency. Although procuring listing agreements may have been 
within the scope of his agency, fraudulently tricking Bearden into signing a warranty 
deed clearly was not. In fact, there was no testimony at trial supporting the conclusion 
that real estate agents generally prepare or record warranty deeds. (R. 708 at 196.) 
Therefore subagency does not provide a basis for the imposition of vicarious liability on 
Wardley. 
C. Wardley Did Not Cloak Gritton With the Apparent Authority to 
Defraud Bearden. 
Finally, Appellees argument regarding Gritton's apparent authority is similarly 
unconvincing. Gritton did not have apparent authority to obtain a warranty deed from 
Bearden and, thus, defraud her. Preparation of warranty deeds were the responsibility of 
the title company, not the real estate agent. (R. 707 at 162.) This is a fact Bearden was 
aware of, as she had some experience with real estate transactions. (R. 707 at 42-44; 
64-65.) 
Significantly, Bearden never checked with Wardley concerning Gritton's 
authority. (R. 707 at 28; 30; 65-67.) Rather, she trusted Gritton and "accepted his 
word." (Id. at 67 (emphasis added).) "'[0]ne who deals exclusively with an agent has 
the responsibility to ascertain that agent's authority despite the agent's representations.'" 
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Bodell Construction Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 945 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (quoting Zions First Nat91 Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 
1988)). 
Finally, Bearden's citation of Cannon II for the proposition that Gritton was acting 
within the scope of his authority, see Brief of Appellees at 28, is a red herring. The 
circumstances under which it is proper to impute the knowledge of an agent to his 
principal for purposes of direct liability are, as noted above, "separate legal questions." 
Cannon //, 2002 UT 99, f 19. 
V. THE JURY'S DAMAGES AWARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
A. The Award of Compensatory Damages is Not Supported by the 
Evidence. 
In this case, the damages award is not supported by competent evidence. At best, 
the evidence in the record supports an award of only $59,621.15, the amount of money 
Mr. Harold Bearden borrowed to pay off Gritton's loans. The remainder of the award is 
speculative, not tied to evidence in the record and, by Bearden's own admission, 
"somewhat confusing." (Brief of Appellees at 30 n. 11.) Bearden's suggestion that this 
Court hold Wardley directly liable for Gritton's rent based on a presumed breach of 
fiduciary duty is a novel theory Bearden does not even attempt to support with case law. 
Bearden attempts to justify the failure to adjust for the amount paid by the 
defendants with whom Bearden settled by referring to matters wholly outside the record 
of this case and, more importantly, outside of the evidence within the jury's 
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consideration. (Brief of Appellees at 30-31.) That Bearden has somewhere, somehow 
accounted for this in her mind is not relevant. The jury did not. 
B. Punitive Damages Should Not Have Been Awarded Against Wardley. 
Bearden correctly notes that Wardley has not challenged the amount of the 
punitive damages award against it. Rather, Wardley contends that there is an insufficient 
legal basis for the award. As noted above, the evidence presented to the jury was 
insufficient to find that Wardley breached its fiduciary duty to Bearden. Therefore, the 
only basis for the award of punitive damages is vicarious liability. 
Bearden contends that the punitive damages can be awarded against Wardley 
based on Gritton's acts because Wardley was reckless in employing or retaining him.5 
(Brief of Appellees at 32-33.) She argues that Gritton should not have been hired 
because, (1) he was in bankruptcy; (2) there was an outstanding federal tax lien against 
his home; (3) he had bad credit; and (4) he was being sued by his former real estate 
broker. Even if all of this is true, it does not establish that Gritton was unfit to act as a 
real estate agent or that Wardley was reckless in employing him, assuming that the issue 
could even have been considered by the jury. 
As discussed in Wardley's opening brief, Section 909 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts sets forth the test of whether punitive damages can be awarded against a 
principal because of an act by an agent. Under that test there are four bases for imposing 
vicarious liability, including the reckless hiring or retention of an unfit agent. See 
Appellant's Brief at 47. While that issue was proposed to be presented to the jury, it 
ultimately was not. Bearden makes no argument that any of the three other bases are 
satisfied. 
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Just because an agent is in bankruptcy, can't pay his taxes, and has bad credit does 
not mean he is unfit. In fact, these circumstances do not even provide grounds for the 
Division of Real Estate to take disciplinary action against an agent. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-11 (setting forth grounds for disciplinary action). Gritton had his real estate 
license and came to Wardley with an excellent reputation. (R. 708 at 183-84.) The 
evidence was insufficient for the jury to determine that Wardley was reckless in hiring 
him. 
Furthermore, when Wardley discovered that Gritton had not deposited the $500 
earnest money as required by its internal policies, it confronted Gritton, and was told that 
the deal had failed. (R. 708 at 226.) When Wardley became aware of Gritton's 
fraudulent conduct in March 1998, it terminated its relationship with him. (R. 707 
at 145.) Therefore, the evidence was insufficient for the jury to determine that Wardley 
was reckless in retaining Gritton. 
In light of the foregoing, the jury's award of $15,000 in punitive damages against 
Wardley should be set aside. 
VI. THE COURT ERRED IN HOW IT HANDLED THE QUESTIONS FROM 
THE JURY. 
Bearden mistakenly blames Wardley's counsel for her counsel's failure to ensure 
that parts of the transcript which it felt were necessary to the appeal were included in the 
record. Utah R. Civ. P. 11(e)(3). Rather than presume the trial court acted appropriately, 
this Court should presume that if there was anything in the proceeding which would have 
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salvaged this matter from being re-tried, Bearden's counsel would have designated those 
additional parts of the transcript to be included in the record. 
That the question presented by the jury is not part of the record is patently 
incorrect. The questions and the trial court's response were properly included by the 
clerk of the trial court under Utah R. App. P. 11(b)(1)(C), as part of the "original papers" 
in the trial court's file. (R. 421 and 422.) What is missing from the record is any 
indication that counsel for the parties were notified or that there were further proceedings 
on the questions. Bearden's counsel's unsubstantiated statements as to his recollection 
are an inadequate substitute for his obligation under Utah R. App. P. 11. 
The jury's question and the trial court's response were not harmless. They 
indicate that the jury was confused about the jury instructions as to which Wardley had 
attempted to object and about which it now complains. The trial court failed to give 
Wardley's attorneys a chance to get at the source of the jury's confusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments advanced by Bearden are an insufficient basis to deny Wardley the 
requested relief. Wardley respectfully submits that the denial of its motions for summary 
judgment and direct verdict should be reversed and requests that the jury verdict and 
judgment based thereon be overturned. 
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SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court issued an opinion in this case on October 11, 2002. See Wardley Better 
Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, 458 UAR 15. In its opinion, this Court held 
that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to impute the 
knowledge of a real estate agent, Aries Hansen ("Hansen"), to the broker with whom he 
was affiliated, Wardley Better Homes & Gardens ("Wardley"). This Court further held 
that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's determination that Wardley 
did not act in bad faith in bringing its action against Tracey Cannon and Cannon 
Associates, Inc. ("Cannon"), and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with 
instructions that the case be remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court the 
opportunity to exercise its discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2) (1996), and to 
award reasonable attorney fees to Cannon unless, relying on a legally sufficient reason, it 
declines to do so under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(2) (1996). 
POINTS OF LAW NEEDING CLARIFICATION 
This Petition for Rehearing presents the following points of law which Wardley 
contends this Court has overlooked or misapprehended, warranting further consideration 
by the Court: 
Issue #1: The Court's conclusion that the knowledge of Wardley's agent 
concerning the fraud he had committed should be imputed to Wardley merits re-
examination. The Court's opinion cited several cases and treatises setting forth 
the general rule that a principal is deemed to have constructive knowledge of all 
material facts of which his agent receives notice or acquires knowledge while 
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acting in the scope of his employment, even if the agent does not in fact inform his 
principal of those facts. However, the Court failed to acknowledge the 
applicability of the well-established exceptions to that general rule or to discuss 
whether any of those exceptions should be applied here. Based on the facts here 
presented, the well-recognized exception that an agent's knowledge is not imputed 
where the agent has an independent motivation not to disclose the information to 
the principal - such as to conceal his fraudulent activities - should apply. 
Issue #2: The Court's conclusion that the knowledge of a corporation's 
agents and officers should be imputed to the corporation because the corporation 
cannot have a belief or intent independent of that of its officers and agents also 
fails to consider an exception to the general which arises when a corporation's 
agent or officer is acting in a transaction in which his interests are adverse to the 
corporation, such as where the officer or agent is engaged in the perpetration of a 
fraud. Under these circumstances, it would be in the interest of the officer or 
agent to conceal his knowledge related to such a transaction. It is unreasonable to 
presume that the officer or agent will communicate his knowledge to the 
corporation. 
Issue #3: The Court's blanket statement that the relationship between a 
real estate broker and its agents is that of employer and employee also deserves 
reconsideration. In support of this conclusion, the Court's opinion cited the cases 
of White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983) and Phillips v. JCM Development 
Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1983). However, the real estate statutes on which 
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the conclusion in those cases was based were subsequently amended to clarify that 
real estate agents can indeed be independent contractors. In light of this fact, the 
issue deserves a more thorough analysis. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S OPINION DOES NOT PAY SUFFICIENT ATTENTION 
TO THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE REGARDING 
IMPUTATION OF AN AGENT'S KNOWLEDGE. 
A. There Is a Well Established Exception to the Imputation of an Agent's 
Knowledge Where the Agent Presumably Will Not Communicate His 
Fraudulent Activities to His Principal. 
Wardley's Petition for Rehearing should be granted because the Court's opinion 
failed to address the exceptions to the general rule regarding the imputation of knowledge 
of an agent to his principal which apply on the facts of this case. The opinion correctly 
cited First National Bank v. Foote for the general rule that "'the knowledge of an agent 
concerning the business which he is transacting for his principal is to be imputed to his 
principal.'" 2002 UT 99, f 16 (quoting First National Bank v. Foote, 12 Utah 157, 168, 
42 P. 205, 207 (1895)). The very next sentence in First National Bank v. Foote, not 
quoted by the Court's opinion, noted that: "There are, however, exceptions to the general 
rule no less well established." 42 P. at 207. These well established exceptions are 
directly implicated in this case. 
The Court's opinion recognizes that the imputation of knowledge from an agent to 
his principal is premised upon a presumption that an agent will discuss with and inform 
his principal of all material facts acquired during the course of the agency. 2002 UT 99, 
f 16. As noted in Foote, "the exceptions to the rule [are based] upon the contrary 
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presumption, that the agent will not communicate to his principal his knowledge of his 
own independent frauds, committed in the course of transacting the principal's business." 
42 P. at 207. See also Evona Investment Co., v. Brummitt, 240 P. 1105, 1110 (Utah 
1925) (recognizing but not applying the exception based on the facts there presented). 
The exception to the general rule, and the presumption that the agent will not 
communicate his fraudulent activities to his principal, are well recognized in the various 
treatises cited by the Court in its opinion. For example, the Court cites section 272 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency for the principle that "the liability of a principal is 
affected by the knowledge of an agent concerning a matter as to which he acts within his 
power to bind the principal or upon which it is his duty to give the principal information." 
2002 UT 99, f 20. Section 272 expressly notes that its statement of the general rule is 
"subject to the rules stated in this Topic." Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 272 
(1958). Section 280 of that Topic states: "If an agent has done an unauthorized act... 
the principal is not affected by the agent's knowledge that he has done ... the act." Id. 
Thus, an unauthorized act by the agent, such as the fraud committed by Hansen in this 
case, should not generally be imputed to the principal.1 
Comment a to section 280 makes an important distinction, also made by the Court 
in its opinion. While the principal may be liable for its agent's wrongful acts, 
"knowledge of the agent in question as to his past acts or his intent as to the future does 
not affect the principal." Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 280, cmt. a. As correctly 
noted by the Court's opinion, "[wjhether a principal is vicariously liable for an agent's 
acts and whether a principal is imputed with his agent's knowledge are separate legal 
questions." 2002 UT 99, f 19 (citation omitted). 
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Similarly, section 432 of Corpus Juris Secundum, another treatise cited by the 
Court, see 2002 UT 99,f16, sets forth the same general rule.2 Section 434, however, 
modifies this rule by stating: 'The rule imputing to a principal notice or knowledge of 
his agent is not one of universal application and does not apply where the circumstances 
are such as to raise a presumption that the agent will not transmit his knowledge to his 
principal." 3 CIS . Agency § 434 (1973). Additionally, section 441 states: "An agent's 
knowledge of fraud is not imputed to his principal where he . . . is engaged in an 
independent fraud." Id. § 441. 
Thus, a thorough examination of the authorities cited in the Court's opinion in 
support of the conclusion that Hansen's knowledge should be imputed to Wardley, 
reveals that in fact, the opposite is true. In the absence of compelling evidence sufficient 
to overcome the contrary presumption, Hansen's knowledge should not have been 
imputed to Wardley. As Cannon failed to marshal any evidence relevant to overcoming 
the presumption, her appeal should have been rejected. 
Section 432 states in relevant part: 
A principal is affected with constructive knowledge, regardless of 
his actual knowledge, of all material facts of which his agent 
receives notice or acquires knowledge while acting in the scope of 
his employment and within the scope of his authority, although the 
agent does not inform his principal thereof. 
3 CJ.S. Agency § 432 (1973). 
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B. The Fact that Only the Broker Can Sue to Collect a Commission 
Weighs Against Imputing the Agent's Knowledge to Wardley, 
In light of the well-recognized exception to the general rule regarding imputation 
of knowledge, the fact that Utah law precluded Hansen, a real estate agent, from 
independently filing suit to recover a commission on the sale of property, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1993), cuts against the imputation of knowledge; not in favor of it as 
the Court's opinion suggests. See 2002 UT 99, f 31. 
Because Hansen could not sue in his own name to recover a commission, he had to 
deceive Wardley, his broker, in order to obtain the commission.3 There was no evidence4 
from the record presented to show that any managerial agent of Wardley "had either 
altered listing agreement dates or taken full advantage of an opportunity to deceive." 
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2001 UT App. 48, f 5, n. 1, 21 P.3d 235. 
The Court's opinion incorrectly viewed this circumstance as weighing in favor of 
finding Wardley liable for attorney fees under section 78-27-56. In fact, it more likely 
Wardley does not mean to suggest or imply that Hansen had some responsibility 
for or participation in making the decision to file the lawsuit to seek the commission. 
Without a factual or evidentiary basis, the Court's opinion noted that Hansen "was an 
active participant in Wardley's decision to file this action against Cannon," 2002 UT 99, 
f 31, and that Wardley "initiated the suit at the employee's urging." Id., f 20. The Court 
apparently adopted the unsubstantiated assertion to this effect set forth in Cannon's brief. 
Reply Brief of Appellants at 1. The Court of Appeals, however, noted "Appellants 
indicate that Hansen urged Wardley to initiate its suit, but provide no citations to the 
record to support that assertion." Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2001 UT 
App. 48, *I 5, n. 1,21 P.3d 235. It was patently sufficient for Wardley's management to 
have in its files the listing agreements which "[o]n their face .. . seemed legitimate," Id. 
at f 8, n. 4, coupled with the knowledge that the seller had closed on a sale during what 
appeared to be the operative term of the listing agreements. 
4
 Cannon relied solely on the legal fiction of imputing Hansen's actions to Wardley. 
2001 UT App. 48,14. 
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motivated Hansen to withhold information from Wardley. If Wardley did not sue 
Cannon, Hansen would not reap the benefit of his fraud. Under the circumstances of this 
case, Hansen had no incentive to inform Wardley that a fraud had been committed. Thus, 
"the contrary presumption, that the agent will not communicate to his principal his 
knowledge of his own independent frauds, committed in the course of transacting the 
principal's business" logically applies. First National Bank v. Foote, 12 Utah at 168, 42 
P. at 207 (emphasis added). 
Because of the presumption that Hansen would not tell Wardley of his fraud, 
Cannon should have been required to marshal the evidence and establish, if she could, the 
evidentiary basis for overcoming that presumption. 
In sum, it is undisputed that Wardley's agent, Hansen, committed a fraudulent act 
by altering the expiration dates on the listing agreements. If Hansen's fraud occurred 
within the scope of the agency relationship, and the other requirements of vicarious 
liability were satisfied, Wardley could be held accountable for any damages caused by its 
agent's fraud. These damages do not include an award of attorney fees in this case.5 The 
Attorney fees are not ordinarily recoverable in fraud cases. See R.T. Nielsen v. 
Cook, 2002 UT 11, f 17, 40 P.3d 1119 ("In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if 
authorized by statute or contract."); Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App. 
109, f 22, 978 P.2d 470 (attorney fees proper where attorney's efforts went to prove facts 
common to recoverable contract claim and non-recoverable fraud claim). An award of 
punitive damages can include attorney fees. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950, 966 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) ("In addition to the possible statutory bases, Utah courts 
have also permitted the amount of attorney fees expended to be considered in calculating 
punitive damages when punitive damages are warranted."). (Cont'd) 
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Court's opinion, however, incorrectly relied on the general rule regarding imputation of 
an agent's knowledge to his principal. Based on long-standing Utah case law, as well as 
black letter principles of agency law, it appears that the exception to the general rule 
regarding imputation of knowledge should apply. 
Because the Court's opinion fails even to acknowledge the well-established 
exception to the rule, there is a strong possibility that the Court reached the wrong 
conclusion based on the facts properly presented to it. In any case, the failure to address 
these exceptions to the general rule regarding the imputation of knowledge will create 
confusion. Therefore, Wardley's Petition for Rehearing should be granted. 
II. THE SUBJECTIVE MENTAL STATE OF A CORPORATION SHOULD 
NOT BE IMPUTED FROM AN AGENT WHO IS ACTING ADVERSE TO 
THE CORPORATION'S INTERESTS. 
While it is generally true that "a corporation has no belief or intent independent of 
that of its officers and agents," 2002 UT 99,122 (citation omitted), this rule also has 
exceptions. A similar exception to imputing knowledge of an agent to a principal has 
long been recognized in the corporate context - and for similar reasons. As noted in 
Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations: 
One well-established exception to the .rule that a corporation 
is charged with knowledge of its officers and agents, is where the 
However, as noted in Wardley's Brief of Appellee, Wardley could not be held vicariously 
liable for punitive damages based on the standard adopted by this Court in Hodges v. 
Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991), which was based on section 909 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and section 217C(c) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency. See also 10 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 4882 (perm, ed., rev. 
vol. 2001) ("a corporate master held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees is 
subject to punitive damages for willful and wanton misconduct only if a superior officer 
of the corporation ordered, participated in, or ratified the misconduct of the employee."). 
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officers and agents are engaged in committing an independent 
fraudulent act upon their own account and the facts to be imputed 
relate to the fraudulent act. 
3 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 826 (perm, ed., rev. vol. 2002). See also 
Western Securities Co. v. Silver King ConsolidatedMin. Co., 57 Utah 88, 103, 192 P. 
664, 670 (1920) ("It is accordingly well settled in the law that a corporation is not 
chargeable with notice of facts because of knowledge on the part of the officer or agent, 
where the officer or agent is dealing with a corporation in his own interest, and where for 
other reasons, his interest is adverse to that of his corporation, so that communication of 
knowledge by him cannot be presumed"). 
Similarly, one of the treatises relied upon by the Court's opinion notes, in a 
different section, that: 
An exception to the general rule that the knowledge of an 
officer or agent will be imputed to the corporation arises when an 
officer, director, employee, or agent is acting in a transaction in 
which he is personally or adversely interested or is engaged in the 
perpetration of an independent fraudulent transaction, where the 
knowledge relates to such transaction and it would be to his 
interest to conceal it. In this type of situation it is unreasonable to 
presume that the officer or agent will communicate such 
knowledge to the corporation. 
18B Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, § 1680 (1985). 
Corporations, like real people, can be principals and have agents; can be 
employers and have employees. Corporations, like real people, can limit the scope of 
authority of its agents and employees. Not every agent or employee of a corporation can 
think, act or "know" on behalf of a corporation; just like with real people. While, unlike 
real people, a corporation's "knowledge" can only happen by way of imputation, the 
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Court's opinion goes too far in stating that "[knowledge can always be imputed to a 
corporation." 2002 UT 99, f 22. When trying to determine the subjective belief or intent 
of a corporation, the employees or agents of a corporation whose subjective beliefs or 
intent - i.e. whose "knowledge" - should be imputed to the corporation should be limited 
by more than the employee's or agent's scope of authority. As with determining the 
intent of a corporation for purposes of imposing punitive damages, a corporation's 
subjective belief or intent for purposes of determining whether attorney fees should be 
awarded under section 78-27-56 should be limited to those of "a superior officer of the 
corporation [who] ordered, participated in, or ratified the misconduct of the employee." 
10 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 4882 (perm, ed., rev. vol. 2001). Cf. 
Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151, 163 (Utah 1991) (punitive damages against a 
corporate employer on the basis of vicarious liability must be based on the conduct of a 
managerial agent who must also be acting within the scope of his employment/agency); 
accord Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 909 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Agency 
§217C(1958). 
As noted in Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations, "[corporations can 
commit almost any kind of a tort that individuals can commit, and are liable for the acts 
of their agents and servant in the same degree as natural persons are liable for the acts 
of their servants and agents." 10 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 4877 
(emphasis added). The knowledge of a corporation can be that of "individual officers 
and employees at a certain level of responsibility." 18B Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations, 
§ 1673 (1985) (emphasis added). At what level "depends on the degree of discretion the 
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employee has in making decisions that will ultimately determine corporate policy." Id. 
The knowledge of a real estate broker's agent who is an independent contractor does not, 
as a matter of law, rise to such a level. 
III. AMENDMENTS TO UTAH'S REAL ESTATE STATUTES CAST DOUBT 
ON THE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT REAL ESTATE AGENTS ARE 
EMPLOYEES OF THEIR BROKER. 
A third issue that needs clarification involves Part II, C of the Court's opinion. 
2002 UT 99, f 25. There, the Court concluded that Wardley's argument that Hansen's 
knowledge cannot be imputed to Wardley because Hansen was an independent contractor 
and not an employee "fails because we have clearly held that 'the relationship between a 
real estate broker and its agents is that of an employer and employee.'" Id. (quoting 
White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1983), and citing Phillips v. JCM Development 
Corp., 666 P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1983)). Regardless of whether an independent 
contractor's knowledge can be imputed to his principal, the Court's analysis on this point, 
which has a great deal of significance to the real estate industry, deserves much more 
attention than it was given in this one sentence conclusion. 
In Phillips, the court found that Utah's statutory system pertaining to real estate 
brokers and salespersons contained "numerous implications of an employer-employee 
relationship." 666 P.2d at 881. At the time of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Phillips, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-3 defined a "real estate salesman" as "any person 
employed or engaged by or on behalf of a licensed real estate broker." Phillips, 666 P.2d 
at 881 (emphasis added). Therefore, the court concluded that the real estate agent in that 
case was an employee of the broker and, as a result, the broker was responsible for the 
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tortious actions of the agent which were done within the course and scope of 
employment. See id. 
The statutory scheme relied upon by the court in Phillips was, however, amended 
by the Utah Legislature shortly after that decision to specifically allow for an independent 
contractor relationship. The definition of "real estate sales agent" now set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-2-2(15) (2000), includes: "any person employed or engaged as an 
independent contractor by or on behalf of a licensed principal real estate broker." 
(Emphasis added.) In addition, the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-10, no 
longer precludes a real estate salesman from accepting commissions "from any person, 
except his employer, who must be a licensed real estate broker." Phillips, 666 P.2d 
at 881. It now provides that no valuable consideration can be accepted "from any person 
except the principal broker with whom he is affiliated and licensed." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-10 (2000) (emphasis added). 
These changes were enacted in 1985. See L. 1985, ch. 162 § 2. Thus, in an 
obvious response to this Court's reasoning in Phillips, the Utah Legislature clearly and 
explicitly modified the statutory scheme governing real estate brokers and agents to allow 
for independent contractor relationships and other forms of affiliation. In light of these 
changes to the statutory scheme upon which Phillips and White were based, the Court 
should have re-examined the issue of whether real estate agents with independent 
contractor relationships are automatically "employees" of their broker. The Court should 
have applied the body of case law that has developed to determine whether or not an 
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employer-employee relationship exists; or whether a worker is an independent 
contractor.6 
A. Whether An Agent is an Independent Contractor or Employee Has 
Important Ramifications With Respect to Wardlev's Liability, 
Although the Court's opinion was premised on principles governing the 
imputation of knowledge, its statement that real estate agents are employees has 
important ramifications with respect to the vicarious liability of a principal for the 
negligent conduct of his agents. In this context a principal is ordinarily not responsible 
for negligent physical harm caused by an independent contractor who, although he may 
be an agent, is not an employee. See Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 250 
(distinguishing between servants and non-servant agents). Thus, when the Court states 
that real estate agents are employees of their broker, it is virtually tantamount to imposing 
liability on the broker for the negligent physical conduct of the real estate agent. 
In sum, the Court's cursory conclusion that a real estate agent is an employee of 
the broker ignores changes to the relevant statutory language expressly stating that a real 
estate agent can also be an independent contractor. If the Court's opinion is truly based 
on imputation of knowledge as opposed to vicarious liability, the Court should avoid 
Along these lines, this Court has held that "whether an employer-employee 
relationship exists... is determined by whether the alleged employer had the right to 
control the employee." Glover ex rel Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 
(Utah 1996) (sustaining summary judgment finding the Boy Scouts of America and Great 
Salt Lake Council, Inc. had no right to control a scoutmaster's activities and, therefore, 
could not be vicariously liable for the scoutmaster's negligence which injured Glover). 
See alsoAverett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246, 249 (Utah 1996). 
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blanket pronouncements that are unnecessary to its decision, and which rely on cases that 
are, based on the statutory changes, no longer good law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's original opinion in this case misapprehends or otherwise fails to 
address several points of law that are important not only for the purposes of this case, but 
also with respect to real estate law generally. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
grant Wardley's Petition for Rehearing. 
DATED this K day of November, 2002. 
f. A — 
2evin N. Anderson 
taan M. Andrews 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Wardley 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Wardley Better Homes and Garden, 
Respondent, 
v. No. 20010245-SC 
20000128-CA 
Leland Mascaro, Sheri Mascaro, 940907000 
Tracy Cannon and Cannon Associates, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Petitioner. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Rehearing 
filed on November 8, 2 002, by Appellee. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is denied. 
FOR THE COURT: 
ir-ll-e 2-
Date —'Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
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TRACY CANNON; CANNON 
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
corporation; LELAND J. MASCARO; 
and SHERI MASCARO; 
Defendants/Petitioners. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
FILE A BRIEF AS AMICUS 
CURIAE 
(This Memorandum is Filed on Behalf 
of the Utah Association of Realtors®) 
Supreme Court No. 20010245 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION OF 
PROPOSED AMICUS CURIAE, UTAH ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS® 
UT DOCS_A #1119927 v1 
The Utah Association of Realtors® (the "Association"), by and through its counsel, 
Christopher J. Kyler, and its co-counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields and Paxton R. Guymon of 
Ballard Spahr Andrews and Ingersoll, LLP, submits this memorandum of points and authorities 
in support of its motion for leave to file a brief as Amicus Curiae. The Association seeks leave 
of Court to file an Amicus Curiae brief to be considered by the Court in connection with the 
Petition for Rehearing filed by Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley") regarding the 
Court's opinion filed on October 11, 2002 as opinion 2002 UT 99 (the "Opinion"). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ASSOCIATION'S INTEREST IN THE OPINION IS SUBSTANTIAL. 
The Association has a substantial interest in the Court's Opinion. The Association's 
membership consists of approximately eight thousand nine hundred (8,900) licensed real estate 
professionals conducting real estate business throughout the State of Utah. Real estate licensees 
in Utah rely heavily upon the Association and its sister companies to protect the interests of real 
estate professionals in this State, and to provide continuing education, business forms, and legal 
guidance. Furthermore, through its lobbying and other efforts during the past thirty (30) years, 
the Association has been extensively involved in creating and refining statutory law in Utah 
regarding real estate professionals and real estate practices, as well as various administrative 
rules for the Utah Division of Real Estate. The pronouncements of law made by this Court in the 
Opinion have far-reaching and potentially very negative implications on the Association and its 
approximately 8,900 members, as explained below. 
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II. THE OPINION, IF LEFT UNMODIFIED, WILL FUNDAMENTALLY 
ALTER CURRENT PRACTICES AND BROKER-AGENT 
RELATIONSHIPS IN UTAH'S REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY. 
The Association is deeply concerned about the following language in the Opinion: 
Wardley, nevertheless, contends that Hansen's knowledge cannot 
be imputed to it because Hansen was an independent contractor 
and not an employee. This argument fails because we have clearly 
held that '[t]he relationship between a real estate broker and its 
agents is that of employer and employee.' White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 
1297,1301 (Utah 1983); see also Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 
P.2d 876, 881 (Utah 1983). 
See 2002 UT 99 at f 25. 
This language represents an incorrect statement of Utah law. If allowed to stand, this 
language will fundamentally change the current practices and relationships of real estate brokers 
and agents in this State. Moreover, this language conflicts with current provisions of the Utah 
Code pertaining to real estate licensees, and is based on outdated and inapplicable case law. 
The above-quoted language of the Opinion cites Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 P.2d 
881, 876 (Utah 1983), as authority. The holding of that decision, however, was based upon the 
language of the Utah Code as it existed in 1983. Indeed, in addressing whether agents are 
employees or independent contractors, the Phillips opinion cites to and relies upon three different 
sections of the Utah Code as they existed in 1983, each of which contained language indicating 
that sales agents were employees of brokers. See id, at 881 (citing language from the 1983 
version of Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-3, 61-2-8 and 61-2-10). 
In response to the Phillips decision, the Utah Legislature amended each of these three 
sections of the Utah Code to expressly allow for sales agents to be engaged as independent 
contractors. See 1985 Laws of Utah, Chapter 162 § 2 (1985 House Bill 284). Following the 
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Legislature's enactment of 1985 House Bill 284, the Phillips case had no further value as 
precedent for whether sales agents are employees or independent contractors under Utah law. 
The present version of the Utah Code expressly provides that sales agents can be engaged 
by brokers as independent contractors. Section 61-2-2(15) of the Utah Code provides: 
'Real estate sales agent' and 'sales agent' means any person 
employed or engaged as an independent contractor by or on behalf 
of a licensed principal real estate broker to perform for valuable 
consideration any act set out in Subsection (12). 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(15) (emphasis added). In other words, the Utah Legislature has 
determined legislatively that brokers may engage sales agents as independent contractors. The 
Opinion incorrectly assumes that sales agents are always employees of brokers. 
As a general practice in this State, a large percentage of brokers and sales agents have 
chosen to structure their relationships as independent contractors. The federal and state tax 
status for many agents and brokers is based on the understanding that agents can be independent 
contractors. Such agents track their income and expenses and make their business decisions 
based on their independent contractor status. Such brokers do not withhold income taxes for 
their independent contractor sales agents. In addition, these brokers' premium payments and 
policies for workers compensation insurance, unemployment insurance, and errors and omissions 
insurance are based upon the independent contractor status of their real estate agents. All of 
these issues are implicated by the Opinion's broad-sweeping and incorrect statement of law. 
Instead of concluding categorically that the relationship between all brokers and agents is 
that of employer and employee, the Court should analyze the facts and circumstances of the 
relationship at issue, including such factors as how the relationship has been structured, any 
agreements between the parties, whether the broker has the right to control the sales agent, how 
A 
the broker pays the sales agent, and other such factors that are traditionally considered in 
determining whether a person is an employee or independent contractor. See, e.g. Utah Home 
Fire Insurance Co. v. Manning, 985 P.2d 243, 246-47 (Utah 1999) (listing factors to consider in 
determining whether a person is an employee or independent contractor); Harry L. Young & 
Sons v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1975) (same). 
In short, the designations of real estate brokers and sales agents are simply matters of 
licensing, based on real estate education, experience and testing requirements. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-2-6. Such licensing designations are not determinative in and of themselves of the 
kind of legal relationship that exists between a broker and an agent. This Court should 
reconsider and correct the misstatements of law contained in the Opinion.1 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Association respectfully requests the Court to grant it leave 
to file an amicus brief in connection with the Petition for Rehearing filed by Wardley. 
DATED this 0 day of November, 2002. 
Christopher J. Kyler 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP 
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq. 
Paxton R. Guymon, Esq. 
Attorneys for Utah Association of Realtors® 
I If the Court grants the Association leave to file an amicus brief, the Association intends 
to address other legal conclusions of the opinion, such as whether knowledge of a sales 
agent's fraudulent activities can be automatically imputed to a broker. 
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Mark O. Morris 
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Attorneys for Tracy Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. 
15 West South Temple #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John R. Bucher 
Attorney for Hansens, Third Party Defendants 
1343 South 1100 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Leland J. and Sheri Mascaro 
357 South 200 East #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI 
MASCARO, TRACY CANNON and 
CANNON ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants/Petitioner. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Supreme Court Case No.: 20010245-SC 
Petitioners Tracey Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc., pursuant to Rules 23, 25 and 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby object to the Motion of the Utah Association 
of Realtors for Leave to File a Brief As Amicus Curiae in this matter, for the reason that such 
motion is untimely. Rule 25 required the Utah Association of Realtors to "file its brief within the 
time allowed the party whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curiae . . . will 
support." Rule 25 also presupposes that prior to such time, a person desiring to file a brief of an 
amicus curiae would file a motion seeking leave to do so. Here, the Utah Association of Realtors 
met neither requirement. 
230947 1 
The subject decision of this court was issued on October 11, 2002. Under Rule 35, a 
petition for rehearing was required to be filed by October 25, 2002. Wardley Better Homes and 
Gardens, and only Wardley Better Homes and Gardens, sought and obtained leave for additional 
time until November 8, 2002 within which to file its petition for rehearing. That petition was 
filed on November 8, 2002. In order to timely file a petition for rehearing on behalf of an amicus 
curiae, the Utah Association of Realtors was required first to file a motion seeking leave to file 
such a petition, and obtain leave of this court prior to the original date of Wardley Better Homes 
and Gardens' original petition for rehearing, which date was October 25, 2002. Of course, the 
Utah Association of Realtors filed nothing before October 25, 2002, and only sought leave on the 
same date Wardley's Petition was due. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Cannon respectfully asks this court to deny the motion of the 
Utah Association of Realtors for Leave to File a Petition for Rehearing by an Amicus Curiae for 
the reason that such motion, and ultimately such petition, are untimely. 
DATED this / ^ f l a y of November, 2002. 
SNELL & WlLMERL.k.P. 
Mark1 
David N. Wolf 
Attorney for Defendants/Petitioners Cannon 
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Case No. 20010245-SC District Court No. 940907000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-00O00 
Wardley Better Homes and Garden, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. Case No. 20010245-SC 
Tracy Cannon, Cannon Associates, 
Inc., a Utah corporation; Leland 
J. Mascaro; and Sheri Mascaro, 
Defendants/Petitioners, 
ORDER 
The Utah Association of Realtors' motion for leave to file a 
brief as amicus curiae is denied. 
- / ^ » Q7^ 
Date 
FOR THE COURT: 
i/y^nd/t^ 
//L&on&xd H. Russon 
v
—Justice 
